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As THE WORLD OF PARTNERSHIP
TAXATION TURNS
Lawrence Lokken*
I. REVOLUTION AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION
ROFESSOR Gergen's very interesting article reminds me of a
story I heard years ago about a renowned orchestral conductor and
one of his musicians. I change the names because I don't quite
trust my memory about who the characters were. The conductor, Maes-
tro G, one of the giants of the music world early in the twentieth century,
was a micro-manager and insisted that his players pencil in markings on
their parts indicating all of the twists and turns in his interpretations. Af-
ter Maestro G had been music director of a leading American orchestra
for several years, the orchestra's principal oboist, Mr. L, a long-standing
member of the orchestra and a prominent figure in his own right, came to
Maestro G, asking, "Is it all right if I ask the orchestra librarian to get me
a new copy of my part for this piece we are doing next month? Over the
years, you've had me make so many pencil markings on my part that I
can hardly read it any more." Maestro G studied Mr. L's part carefully
for three or four minutes and said, "No, Mr. L, you don't need a new
part. If you will just mark in 'crescendo' in bar 59 and 'ritardando' in bar
143, your old part will be just fine."
A few years ago, I wrote an article exploring the possibility of substitut-
ing something radically different for the present income tax rules for part-
ners and partnerships.' As "an answer to" my suggestions,2 Professor
Gergen essentially says, "No, Professor Lokken, you don't need a new
system. Over the years, we have penciled in many useful things on the
old system, and I have a few additional things we need to pencil in. Then,
everything will be just fine, at least until the next rehearsal." Well,
perhaps.
Many scholars of partnership taxation have a nagging suspicion that
much, perhaps most, of subchapter K is honored principally in the
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breach. 3 The revolutionary changes so ably described by Professor
Gergen consist of a dense web of detailed rules that are very difficult to
learn, understand, remember, and apply. For 1999, the most recent year
for which the IRS has published the relevant statistics, federal income tax
returns were filed by 1,936,919 partnerships. 4 My guess is that relatively
few of these nearly 2 million partnerships had tax advisors whose under-
standing of subchapter K is sufficient to allow them to apply any of the
rules described and proposed by Professor Gergen and that very few of
the IRS personnel charged with auditing those returns could work com-
fortably with the rules. Even highly competent tax generalists may stum-
ble badly on partnership issues not resolved by the basic pass-through
idea of subchapter K. The construct of rules discussed by Professor
Gergen may not even be part of the universe in which the income tax
laws are applied and enforced with respect to a large majority of partner-
ships and partners.
Subchapter K is not the only disturbingly complex piece of the Internal
Revenue Code. However, many complex structures in the Code have
more specialized applications. A corporation need not have sophisticated
advice on the reorganization provisions unless it engages in a reorganiza-
tion transaction, on the qualified retirement plan provisions unless it
wants to have a qualified plan, or on the controlled foreign corporation
rules unless it has a foreign subsidiary. In each of these instances, the
specialness of the transactions serves as a signal of the need for special-
ized advice. Subchapter K, in contrast, deals with such matters as partner
contributions, allocations of partnership income among the partners, and
distributions to partners-issues and transactions common to all partner-
ships, regardless of the nature of their activities, assets, and businesses.
Although some aspects of subchapter K only apply in specialized circum-
stances, there is no clear boundary between the everyday and the special-
ized, no obvious signals to tax practitioners who are not partnership
specialists of where they may tread without falling into a morass of legal
complexity with which they are not prepared to deal.
On the other hand, all of the complexity of subchapter K, including the
added complexity proposed by Professor Gergen, responds to genuine
needs. Simple tax rules often yield distorted results when applied to com-
plex financial and business arrangements. Although the distortions can
adversely affect taxpayers, the principal problem with simplistic tax rules
is that sophisticated tax practitioners exploit them ruthlessly to the gov-
ernment's detriment. Over the last three decades-the period of the
revolution Professor Gergen describes-the aggressiveness of tax practi-
tioners, and the willingness of their clients to follow aggressive tax advice,
has steadily grown, with perhaps a brief pause following the enactment of
3. See, e.g., George K. Yin, The Future Taxation of Private Business Firms, 4 FLA.
TAx REV. 141 (1999).




the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The revolutionary accretion of detail in
subchapter K is largely a response to aggressive uses of partnerships for
tax avoidance, resembling a steady build-up in the arsenal of an army
caught in an unwinnable guerilla war.
The dilemma of subchapter K is that rules considered essential to the
effective application of the tax laws to some partnerships and their part-
ners apply to all partnerships, including those utterly lacking in capability
to apply the rules, which likely comprise a large majority of all partner-
ships. As Professor Gergen notes, Professor George Yin has proposed a
solution to this dilemma: a simplified subchapter K ("K lite") that could
apply to ordinary partnerships, leaving the full panoply of subchapter K
to apply only to more complex partnerships for which it is more appropri-
ate.5 Although Professor Gergen does not say directly whether he favors
this proposal, he implies that he does, so that "we may demand more of
entities that opt for the freedom of K-heavy."
6
Of course, we already have a K lite, consisting of the present sub-
chapter K stripped of all of the rules and nuances that tax practitioners
serving ordinary partnerships do not understand and simply ignore. The
value of a more formal K lite, as Professor Yin proposes, is that it erects
signposts, informing practitioners of just what the simplified rules are and
just what must be done (and avoided) in order to maintain a partnership's
eligibility to use the simplified rules.
But we already have a K lite in this form too: subchapter S, which pro-
vides a relatively simple scheme for allocating income among sharehold-
ers of electing corporations observing a relatively simple set of
qualification criteria. Subchapter S is very popular. For 1999, the most
recent year reported, approximately 2.7 million corporations filed returns
as S corporations. 7 For that year, the number of S corporation returns was
more than 135 percent of the number of partnership returns. These sta-
tistics may surprise some observers, who see subchapter S as a relic of an
earlier era. Limited liability company laws protect members against per-
sonal liability for entity debt much like corporation laws and are much
more flexible than corporation laws; moreover, an LLC and its members
can enjoy the permissiveness of subchapter K and not be burdened by the
rigidities of subchapter S. However, the 1999 statistics lend little support
to the common assumption that LLCs are well on the way to supplanting
S corporations. The number of S corporation returns in 1999 was 5.3 per-
cent larger than the number of 1998 returns, while the number of partner-
ship returns increased by 4.4 percent. 8 Approximately 302,000
corporations first elected S status for 1999, of which approximately
5. Gergen, supra note 2, at 345.
6. Id.
7. Kelly Bennett, S Corporation Returns, 1999, 21 STAT. INCOME BULL. 59 (2002).
8. Zempel & Wheeler, supra note 4, at 48 fig.A. The number of LLCs, however,
grew by 25.2 percent-from 470,657 in 1998 to 589,403 in 1999-while the number of gen-
eral partnerships declined and the number of limited partnerships grew only 3.4 percent.
Id. at 53 fig.F.
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217,000 were newly organized corporations. 9 Newly organized S corpora-
tions thus exceeded ten percent of the number of all partnerships, new
and old. Vanishing relic, indeed! Anecdotal evidence indicates that or-
ganizing a new venture as an LLC, checking the box corporate, and elect-
ing subchapter S is a not uncommon (if treacherous) practice.
Do we need K lite in addition to subchapter S? K lite, like subschapter
S, would be elective, and it is not clear that the life of a typical small
business would be materially improved by the addition of another elec-
tion to be evaluated by its, perhaps already overstressed, tax advisor.
Ideally, K lite might be substituted for subchapter S. However, that
would raise the problem of what to do with the millions of existing S
corporations. Would they be forced to undergo taxable liquidations if
their owners want to retain pass-through taxation? Or, would they be
given a tax-free pass into subchapter K? Presently, a C corporation can
elect to become an S corporation without immediate tax consequences.
Would that privilege disappear with subchapter S? If S corporations were
generally allowed to pass tax-free into subchapter K, would this privilege
extend to former C corporations, including corporations that became S
corporations shortly before repeal of subchapter S? Surely, a proposal to
eliminate the runaway favorite form of small business organization could
succeed politically only if leavened with significant benefits for taxpayers.
Whether or not subchapter S persists, I am not sure that it is realistic to
expect that, with the addition of K lite, "we may demand more of entities
that opt for the freedom of K-heavy." 10 By demanding more, Professor
Gergen apparently means requiring compliance with highly refined rules
that are conceived with a focus on achieving economically realistic re-
sults, not ease of application. I agree with his assumption that a business
or financial venture organized in a complex way disqualifying it from K
lite could usually afford to obtain the sophisticated tax advice necessary
to comply with complex rules tailored to match the complexity in the
venture's organization. For such a venture, sophisticated accounting is
necessary to effectuate the partners' agreement, and the tax laws do not
usually impose an undue burden by requiring tax accounting at the same
level of sophistication as the venture's financial accounting. Tax rules
might, in fact, show the way to financial accounting more faithful to part-
ners' agreements.
However, partnerships will generally comply with difficult tax rules
only if the IRS insists, and in my only partially informed opinion, the IRS
could insist only by investing far more resources in the audit of partner-
ship returns than it presently does. This investment must be judged not
only in terms of the number of returns audited, but also in terms of the
education, training, and talent of the personnel assigned to the task. I
9. The number of LLC returns increased by 118,746 from 1998 to 1999. See id. at 53
fig.F. Although the number of new LLCs was larger than this number (some 1998 filers
having disappeared from the 1999 rolls) it seems unlikely that the number of new LLCs
was a great as the number of newly organized S corporations.
10. Gergen, supra note 2, at 345.
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point, of course, to only an aspect of a much larger problem of tax non-
compliance and governmental willingness to do something about it. Our
elected representatives seem to be growing beyond the belief that great
gain lies in demonizing those charged with enforcing the tax laws. This
growth seems to be leading only very gradually to a commitment to give
the IRS the resources it requires to obtain a minimal level of tax compli-
ance.1 Until that commitment is more firmly in place, the intellectual
revolution that is the subject of Professor Gergen's article will not be-
come a revolution in the practical reality of partnership taxation.
II. CONCEPTUAL ELEGANCE IN PARTNERSHIP TAXATION
As a teacher and observer, one of the things I like best about partner-
ship taxation is that so much of it is spun out of a few fundamental ideas.
Professor Gergen's article nicely illustrates at least two of these ideas.
First, there is the often noted dichotomy between the entity theory of
partnership taxation, which views a partnership as a thing independent of
its partners, at least for some purposes, and the aggregate theory, which
views a partnership as merely an aggregate of the separate interests of the
partners. The revolution Professor Gergen discusses can be seen as tri-
umph of the aggregate theory over the entity theory. Increasingly, the
rules determine tax consequences to partners by looking through the
partnership veil to ascertain the partners' separate interests in partner-
ship income, deductions, losses, and assets. Noting this does not, of
course, demonstrate that the revolution is either good or bad. Arguments
over whether the aggregate theory or the entity theory suggests the ap-
propriate answers to particular questions of partnership taxation have
persisted throughout subchapter K's history.12
A second fundamental concept illustrated by Professor Gergen is the
substantial economic effect idea. The famous Haig-Simons definition of
income, modified for application to a business entity, is that income for
any period is the change in the entity's net worth over the period, ad-
justed for contributions and distributions. 13 Translated into the tax law's
terminology of gross income and deductions, gross income is an item that,
standing alone, enhances net worth and a deduction is a cost that impairs
net worth. 14 The substantial economic effect idea is that partnership gross
11. The IRS has given Congress some reason to question whether the IRS could, even
with more funds, do an effective job of auditing partnerships. See George Guttman, Why
Did The K-1 Matching Program Go Awry?, 97 TAX NOTES 736 (2002) (discussing the IRS's
difficulties in matching information returns filed by partnerships with individual returns of
partners).
12. For a recent example, see Brown Group, Inc. v. Comm'r, 104 T.C. 105 (1995) (rely-
ing extensively on aggregate theory in applying controlled foreign corporation rules to
partnership income), rev'd, 77 F.3d 217 (8th Cir. 1996) nonacq., (criticizing Tax Court's
broad acceptance of aggregate theory).
13. See 1 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES & GIFTs 3.1 (3d ed. 1999).
14. This statement is, of course, a broad generalization that holds only approximately
with respect to many items of income and deduction.
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income, gains, losses, and deductions should be allocated among partners
in the proportions that they enjoy or suffer the corresponding increases
or decreases in partnership net worth. Substantial economic effect is the
statutory touchstone for partnership allocations generally. 15 Professor
Gergen identifies as the starting point in the intellectual revolution in
partnership taxation the Treasury's adoption of a capital account analysis
to effectuate the substantial economic effect rule.' 6
However, the idea is reflected in many rules not containing the phrase
"substantial economic effect." An example is § 704(c), which requires,
among other things, that a partnership's gain or loss on selling property
contributed to it by a partner must generally be allocated to the contrib-
uting partner to the extent of the unrealized appreciation or depreciation
in the property when contributed. Assume A and B organize an equal
partnership by A contributing Blackacre, worth $1,000 and having a basis
to A of $600, and B contributing $1,000 in cash. The partnership must
record Blackacre on its books at fair market value ($1,000), 17 even
though it succeeds to A's adjusted basis for the property of $600.18 If the
partnership later sells Blackacre for, say, $1,100, realizing gain of $100 for
book purposes and gain of $500 for tax purposes, A's share of the tax gain
is $450, consisting of the $400 of appreciation that accrued to A before
the contribution and one half of the amount by which Blackacre appreci-
ated while held by the partnership. By crediting A's capital account with
Blackacre's fair market value on contribution, the partnership assigns to
A the portion of the partnership's initial net worth represented by the
precontribution appreciation. Allocation to A of the first $400 of the
partnership's gain on selling Blackacre thus effectuates the substantial ec-
onomic effect idea, even though it is accomplished by a rule in which the
words "substantial economic effect" do not appear.
The regulations depart from the substantial economic effect idea with
respect to some situations involving contributed property. Assume the
AB partnership sells Blackacre in an arm's length transaction for $900.
The sale results in book loss of $100 (selling price of $900, less book value
of $1,000) and tax gain of $300 (amount realized of $900, less adjusted
basis of $600). The substantial economic effect idea suggests that A
should be allocated gain on the sale of $350, consisting of $400 of precon-
tribution appreciation and one half of the postcontribution loss of $100,
and B should be allocated $50 of loss. Only in this way can the tax alloca-
tions accurately reflect the partners' agreement on sharing economic
gains and losses. However, the regulations have long imposed a ceiling
rule, which in this situation precludes an allocation to any partner exceed-
ing the partnership's total gain on a sale. 19 Thus, all of the tax gain ($300)
is allocated to A, but no tax gain or loss is allocated to B. The apparent
15. See I.R.C. § 704(b) (2002).
16. See Gergen, supra note 2, at 343.
17. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b) (2002).
18. See I.R.C. § 723 (2002).
19. This rule is presently stated in Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(b)(1) (2002).
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basis for the ceiling rule is that a partnership allocation can only consist of
a division among the partners of a partnership item computed under the
tax rules generally defining income, gain, deduction, and loss.
The regulations provide two alternatives to the traditional method, one
of which, a remedial allocation method, 20 can be seen as an expression of
the substantial economic effect idea. Under the remedial method, as ap-
plied to the example, AB's tax gain of $300 is allocated to A, as under the
traditional method, but additional allocations are made to A of a notional
$50 of gain and to B of a notional $50 of loss. The notional items have
the same character as the actual gain. The results accurately reflect the
partners' agreement for sharing economic gains and losses: that A have
the benefit of the $400 of unrealized appreciation in Blackacre as of the
time of its contribution and that A and B share equally any appreciation
or depreciation occurring after the partnership's formation.
Partnerships are generally free to choose among the three alternative
rules for handling items associated with contributed property. However,
given the pervasive influence of the substantial economic effect idea in
recent legislative and administrative changes, the Treasury could logically
proceed one step further in this direction by making the remedial alloca-
tion method the exclusive and mandatory rule for all items related to
contributed property. As Professor Gergen notes, both Congress and the
Treasury have accepted in other contexts that a single adjustment,
whether positive or negative, can be fragmented into a group of positive
and negative adjustments. 2' The notion that partnership allocations can
only consist of divisions of items determined under tax rules generally
defining income, gain, deduction, and loss now seems quite old fashioned.
If the notion had validity, the remedial allocation method, even as an
elective alternative, would be illegitimate. Every application of the ceil-
ing rule produces distortion. 22 By abandoning the rule, the Treasury
would eliminate such distortions and simplify the law by eliminating both
any need for taxpayers to evaluate competing options and any need for
an anti-abuse rule to disallow overly aggressive uses of the alternative
rules.
Professor Gergen devotes considerable attention to so-called reverse
§ 704(c) allocations, using the following example: the equal partnership of
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(d) (2002).
21. See Gergen, supra note 2, at 350, 360. Two examples of this cited by Professor
Gergen are regulations under § 755, adopted in 1999, and a 1997 statutory change to
§ 732(b), also effectuated by regulations adopted in 1999. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.732-1(c), 1.755-
1 (2002). In both of these contexts, the regulations require a difference between partner
basis and partnership basis to be allocated among assets by a series of adjustments that can
include both increases and decreases.
22. A partnership's use of an allocation method, including the traditional method, is
disallowed if the contribution of the property and allocation "are made with a view to
shifting the tax consequences of built-in gain or loss among the partners in a manner that
substantially reduces the present value of the partners' aggregate tax liability." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.704-3(a)(10) (2002). However, the mere fact of a distortion, even one benefiting tax-
payers, does not preclude use of the traditional method.
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K and L is organized by contributions of $10,000 each from the partners,
which the partnership uses to buy securities for $20,000. When the securi-
ties have increased in value to $50,000, M contributes $25,000 for a one
third interest in the partnership. If, on admitting M, the partnership re-
states the book value of the securities to $50,000 and the capital accounts
of K and L to $25,000 each, tax gain on a subsequent sale of the securities
will first be allocated to K and L in the amount of $15,000 each, their
shares of the $30,000 by which the securities appreciated before M be-
came a partner. This is the reverse § 704(c) allocation. For example, on
later selling the securities for $74,000, the partnership would have book
gain of $24,000 ($74,000, less book value of $50,000), allocable $8,000 to
each partner, and tax gain of $54,000 ($74,000, less adjusted basis of
$20,000), allocable to K and L in the amount of $23,000 each (sum of
$15,000 and $8,000) and to M in the amount $8,000.
Reverse § 704(c) allocations reflect the substantial economic effect
idea. By restating the book value of the securities at $50,000 when M
becomes a partner, the partners reserve to K and L the economic enjoy-
ment of $30,000 of appreciation in the securities' value. The reverse
§ 704(c) allocations allocate to K and L the tax items corresponding to
this appreciation. Only by the reverse § 704(c) allocations can the tax
results accurately reflect the partners' sharing arrangement.
Restatements on the admission of new partners, and the resulting re-
verse § 704(c) allocations, are, at least nominally, optional.23 Professor
Gergen suggests that the Treasury make them mandatory, and I agree
with this suggestion.24 If these procedures are not followed, the KLM
partnership's tax gain of $54,000 on selling the securities (amount realized
of $74,000, less adjusted basis of $20,000), is allocated one third to each
partner ($18,000 each), with the following results:
After admission of M Gain on sale After sale





K $10,000 $18,000 $28,000
L 10,000 18,000 28,000
M 25,000 18,000 43,000
$45,000 $99,000
23. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f) (2002).
24. See Gergen, supra note 2, at 349. A carefully crafted set of special allocations
could serve the same function as a restatement and reverse § 704(c) allocations. Partners
may prefer to handle the issue in this way in some situations, particularly if they do not
agree on the value of partnership assets. If the Treasury makes reverse § 704(c) allocations
mandatory, it should consider whether and, if so, under what circumstances, special alloca-
tions could be substituted for reverse § 704(c) allocations.
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If the partnership liquidates immediately after selling the securities by
distributing its asset (money) in accordance with the capital accounts, the
liquidating distributions to the partners, $28,000 each to K and L and
$43,000 to M, are starkly inconsistent with the agreement to be equal
partners. Without a restatement, the partners must choose between (1)
making distributions to the partners in accordance with the capital ac-
counts, thereby violating their agreement, or (2) making distributions in
accordance with their agreement, thereby vitiating all tax allocations as
violative of the substantial economic effect rule. For a partnership admit-
ting a new partner when partnership assets are materially appreciated or
depreciated, a restatement is mandated by the practical need to do tax
allocations in a way that does not upset the partners' agreement. Revis-
ing the restatement rule in the regulations to require, rather than merely
permit, restatements would thus simplify the rules in practical
application.
III. DISCOUNTS AND OPTIONS
Professor Gergen ends his article with a discussion of two issues whose
resolution, he speculates, might stretch the intellectual revolution in part-
nership taxation beyond the breaking point: the treatment of discounts
(issuance of a partnership interest in exchange for a capital contribution
less than a ratable portion of the net fair market value of partnership
assets), premiums, and options to acquire partnership interests from the
partnership. 25
Discounts may be more troublesome in theory than they are in prac-
tice. Assume the equal partnership of K and L, which owns securities
worth $50,000 for which it has an adjusted basis of $20,000, admits M as a
one third partner in exchange for a contribution of $16,000, which is
$6,000 less than one third of the net value of the partnership's assets im-
mediately thereafter; K, L, and M deal at arm's length and agree on the
discounted price because they collectively conclude that the market
would allow a discount of this size to reflect M's status as holder of a
minority interest. Conceptually, this situation is troublesome because it
seems to undermine the aggregate theory of partnership taxation, which,
I suggest, is the foundation of the intellectual revolution in partnership
taxation. That the value of the whole (partnership) does not equal the
sum of the values of its parts (the partnership interests) suggests that the
whole differs in kind from its parts. Moreover, the idea that a partnership
is merely an aggregate of the separate interests of the partners can readily
be translated into operational tax rules only by assuming that partnership
assets and interests in a partnership are merely two expressions of the
same thing and that the aggregate value of one equals the aggregate value
of the other.
25. See Gergen, supra note 2, at 355-56.
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However, the rules derived from this assumption seem to work well
enough when applied in situations where the assumption is contrary to
fact. In the KLM example, at least two results are possible if the partners
elect to restate book values on the admission of M. One possibility is to
restate partnership assets at their actual fair market values, with the part-
nership's tax and book balance sheets, immediately after M's admission
to the partnership and after the partnership's subsequent sale of the se-
curities for $74,000, being as follows:
After admission
of M Gain on sale After sale
Tax Book Tax Book Tax Book
Assets
Money $16,000 $16,000 $90,000 $90,000
Securities 20,000 50,000 $54,000 $24,000
$36,000 $66,000
Capital accounts
K $10,000 $25,000 $23,000* $ 8,000 $33,000 $33,000
L 10,000 25,000 23,000* 8,000 33,000 33,000
M 16,000 16,000 8,000 8,000 24,000 24,000
$36,000 $66,000 $90,000 $90,000
* The tax allocations to K and L consist of their shares of the amount by which the
securities appreciated before M's admission to the partnership ($15,000 each) and of
the book gain ($8,000 each).
Alternatively, the securities could be valued in the restatement at
$32,000, the figure that equates the values of the partnership assets with
the values of the partnership interests, with the following results:
After admission
of M Gain on sale After sale
Tax Book Tax Book Tax Book
Assets
Money $16,000 $16,000 $90,000 $90,000
Securities 20,000 32,000 $54,000 $42,000
$36,000 $48,000
Capital accounts
K $10,000 $16,000 $20,000* $14,000 $30,000 $30,000
L 10,000 16,000 20,000* 14,000 30,000 30,000
M 16,000 16,000 14,000 14,000 30,000 30,000
$36,000 $48,000 $90,000 $90,000
* The tax allocations to K and L consist of their shares of the amount by which the
securities' restated value exceeded their cost ($6,000 each) and of the book gain
($14,000 each).
The first alternative, which leaves M with a lower capital account than
the other partners, may seem to contradict the partners' agreement that
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each would have a one third interest in the partnership. However, K and
L might argue for this alternative on the ground that the amount by
which the securities appreciated before M's admission as a partner should
be reserved exclusively to them and that M's one third interest should
only include her capital contribution and one third of the income, gains,
and losses accruing after she becomes a partner; M's lesser capital ac-
count, by this view of the matter, simply reflects the discounted price for
which her interest was issued. M, in contrast, might claim the benefits of
the second alternative, arguing that because all partnership interests are
minority interests, none is more valuable than any other and the excess of
inside value over outside value does not truly exist for any partner until it
is unlocked by sale of the securities and distribution of the proceeds to
the partners.
The choice between the alternatives should be considered a matter for
agreement among the partners, not one to be imposed by the tax law. As
shown by the balance sheets, under both alternatives, each partner's tax
and book capital accounts are equal after the securities are sold, demon-
strating that both alternatives allocate the tax gain in the same propor-
tions as the partners receive the corresponding economic gain. Both
alternatives are therefore consistent with the substantial economic effect
concept. Which alternative best reflects the partners' agreement is for
the partners, not the tax law, to decide. However, the case illustrates the
importance of restating the books on the admission of a new partner.
Without a restatement, it would likely be impossible to ascertain the part-
ners' agreement on how they would share economically the appreciation
in partnership assets accruing before M became a partner.
In many instances, options on partnership interests probably raise no
special tax issues, apart from the discount issue just discussed. The treat-
ment of these options should be consistent with the tax rules for options
generally, which are not particularly rational or consistent with tax rules
applying to closely related transactions but are firmly established. 26 As-
sume W grants H an option to purchase Blackacre, which is presently
worth $800 and has an adjusted basis to W of $600; the option price is
$950, the option is exercisable at any time within the next three years, and
H pays W a premium of $50 for the option. If H exercises the option, W
recognizes gain on the ensuing sale of Blackacre of $400 (amount realized
of sum of $50 and $950, less adjusted basis of $600), and H takes a cost
basis for Blackacre of $1,000. If the option expires unexercised, W has
income of $50 at the time of lapse and H is allowed a deduction in the
same amount.
Professor Gergen's option example is as follows: K and L each contrib-
ute $9,500 in cash on the organization of the KL partnership, which im-
mediately grants M an option to acquire a one third interest in the
partnership for $16,000, receives an option premium of $1,000 from M,
26. See 2 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 13, 9 57.3.1.
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and invests the $20,000 received from K, L, and M in securities. M exer-
cises the option when the securities are worth $50,000.27 Consistently
with the treatment of options generally, M should not be treated as a
partner until she exercises the option, and appreciation in the underlying
property while the option is outstanding should be taxed to K and L. The
procedures for restating partnership books after the admission of a new
partner, applied as of the time M exercises the option, produce these re-
sults and are thus consistent with the option rules. Since M, on exercising
the option, acquires her interest at a discount, the application of these
procedures raises the issues discussed above.
In-the-money options, however, should be treated differently, in at
least some circumstances. Assume K and L each contribute $8,000 cash
on the organization of the KL partnership, which immediately grants M
an option to acquire a one third interest in the partnership for $5,000,
receives an option premium of $4,000 from M, and invests the $20,000
received from K, L, and M in securities. In this case, M should probably
be considered a partner from the outset since she will likely exercise the
option and failure to treat her as a partner from the outset would open
the door to using such a device to shift tax gains to persons (K and L)
who will never reap the corresponding economic gains. The option in this
case is not wholly without substance; until she exercises the option, M
cannot lose more than $4,000. However, if M is treated as a partner from
the beginning, the protection against loss provided by the option can be
reflected in the allocation of partnership losses. For example, M could be
given an initial capital account of $4,000 and allocated one third of all
partnership income, gains, and losses, except that losses would be allo-
cated to K and L only once M's capital account reaches zero.
In sum, I do not share Professor Gergen's fear that the issues raised by
discounts, premiums, and options threaten to end the intellectual revolu-
tion in partnership taxation. Revolutionary dogma (the new thinking)
can probably provide acceptable solutions for all of these problems.
However, the solutions will bring us no closer to answering the more im-
ponderable question: has the revolution ever begun, and should it ever
begin, for the daily practice of partnership taxation for the ordinary
partnership?
27. See Gergen, supra note 2, at 357.
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